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Abstract—The limited scalability, reliability, and security of
today’s utility communication infrastructures are main obstacles
for the deployment of smart grid applications. The C-DAX
project aims at providing a cyber-secure publish/subscribe mid-
dleware tailored to the needs of smart grids. C-DAX provides
end-to-end security, and scalable and resilient communication
among participants in a smart grid. This work presents the
C-DAX security architecture, and proposes different key distri-
bution mechanisms. Security properties are defined for control
plane and data plane communication, and their underlying
mechanisms are explained. The presented work is partially
implemented in the C-DAX prototype and will be deployed in a
field trial.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, smart grid (SG) refers to the next-generation elec-
trical power grid designed to enhance the resilience of the
grid to power flow disruptions, improve energy efficiency,
and reduce carbon emissions. To accomplish these goals, the
modern electrical power grid will incorporate a wide variety
of SG applications, e.g., synchrophasor-based real-time state
estimation [1], electric vehicle charging, and future retail
energy transactions [2]. However, one of the main obstacles in
the way of the deployment of SG applications is the limited
capabilities of today’s utility communication infrastructure in
terms of scalability, reliability, and security.
The Cyber-secure Data and Control Cloud for power grids
(C-DAX) project [3] develops such a cyber-secure com-
munication middleware for smart grids, applying the pub-
lish/subscribe (pub/sub) paradigm to enable scalable, trans-
parent, and secure end-to-end communication [4] between
publishers and subscribers. Additional major advantages of
C-DAX include resilient communication [5], and support for
real-time applications [1].
The main contribution of this paper is the description of the
C-DAX security architecture, and a presentation and discus-
sion of its key distribution mechanisms. Parts of the security
concept are already implemented in the C-DAX prototype, and
will be deployed in a real-world power grid as part of a field
trial.
This work is structured as follows. We review relevant as-
pects of the C-DAX communication architecture in Section II
and present the C-DAX security architecture in Section III.
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In Section IV, we present methods for distributing updated
symmetric keys for data plane communication and discuss
their properties. We review related work in Section V and
draw conclusions in Section VI.
II. C-DAX: A CYBER-SECURE DATA AND CONTROL
CLOUD FOR POWER GRIDS
C-DAX is an FP7 project funded by the European Com-
mission which adapts the pub/sub paradigm to the needs of
power grids. It aims at developing a cyber-secure and scalable
communication middleware for SGs to facilitate the flexible
integration of emerging SG applications. We give a brief
overview on the C-DAX architecture, its components, and
basic interactions. Further details on the C-DAX architecture
and its features can be found in [5] and [1].
A. Topic-Group Communication
C-DAX uses the pub/sub paradigm to decouple commu-
nication partners in space, time, and synchronization [6],
[7]. Information is organized in so-called topics. A topic
is an abstract representation of a unidirectional information
channel, and is addressed using its unique name and possibly
attributes, e.g., data type, location, and time. Publishers and
subscribers register at a broker for a certain topic. Publishers
send messages for that topic to the broker, which eventually
forwards them to the subscribers. Data transmitted within a
topic is called topic data.
B. Components
Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure and interactions of the
C-DAX architecture. It is composed of C-DAX clients and the
C-DAX cloud. SG applications use C-DAX clients as interface
to the C-DAX cloud, which handle all C-DAX signaling
transparent to the respective application. Publishers are C-
DAX clients generating data for a specific topic. Subscribers
are C-DAX clients interested in certain topic data. C-DAX
nodes form the C-DAX cloud, and provide a specific set of
functions to the cloud and clients.
Designated nodes (DNs) provide access for clients to the
C-DAX cloud. They act as first point of contact and are
responsible for forwarding topic data to and from the cloud,
i.e., clients are pre-configured with DNs. Data brokers (DBs)
store and forward topic data to DNs. Each topic is assigned
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Fig. 1. The C-DAX architecture. Basic signaling steps include client join
(step 1, 2, and 5), data plane configuration (step 3 and 4), and topic data
transmission (step 6).
to a DB, where its publishers send topic data to. DBs store
topic data for a certain time, and forward it to the topic’s
subscribers. The exact assignment of topics to DBs is subject
to management decisions, and may be changed during runtime.
Topic names need to be mapped to DBs so that join requests
can be sent to appropriate DBs that manage registrations. To
that end, resolvers (RSes) hold topic-to-DB mappings and pro-
vide a resolution interface through which they answer mapping
requests of other nodes. Security-related functionalities are
provided by a security server (SecServ), e.g., authentication,
authorization, and key distribution.
In this paper, we use term forwarding nodes for DNs and
DBs. The term component refers to both C-DAX clients and
C-DAX nodes.
C. Basic Interactions
C-DAX components act jointly to provide communication
services. We describe basic interactions using the examples of
data publication and subscription.
1) Publication of Topic Data: The initial message exchange
prior to topic data publication is shown on the left side of
Figure 1; solid black lines represent publisher-specific control
plane communication. When the publisher wants to publish
topic data, it first sends a join message to the SecServ over its
DN using the topic identifier (step 1) for publisher authentica-
tion and authorization (step 2). When the authentication and
authorization of the publisher is successful, the DN forwards
the join message to the RS using the topic identifier (step 3).
The RS looks up its database for the topic-to-DB mapping. If
such a mapping exists, the RS sends the responsible topic-to-
DB mapping to the DN which installs a forwarding entry for
that topic in its internal forwarding table (step 4), and the DN
sends a join acknowledgment message to the publisher (step
5). The publisher starts pushing data to its DN which forwards
it to the responsible DB which stores the topic data (step 6).
2) Subscription to Topic Data: Topic data retrieval works
similarly. The initial message exchange prior to topic data
retrieval is shown on the right side of Figure 1; dashed black
lines represent subscriber-specific control plane communica-
tion. When the subscriber wants to retrieve topic data, it first
sends a join message to the SecServ over its DN using the topic
identifier (step 1) for subscriber authentication and authoriza-
tion (step 2). When the authentication and authorization of the
subscriber is successful, the DN forwards the join message
to the RS using the topic identifier (step 3). At the same
time, the DN installs a topic-to-client entry in its internal
forwarding table, and sends a join acknowledgment message
to the publisher (step 5). The RS looks up its database for
the topic-to-DB mapping. If such a mapping exists, the RS
forwards the join message to the responsible DB which installs
a topic-to-subscriber’s-DN entry in its internal forwarding
table (step 4), and starts pushing topic data to all registered
subscribers’ DNs (step 6).
III. C-DAX SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
We now describe the security architecture of C-DAX. We
first discuss the design rationale behind the security concept,
introduce the basic terminology, and finally specify the re-
quired mechanisms and keys which are used to implement
those properties in C-DAX.
A. Design Rationale and Terminology
Topic data transmission should be protected end-to-end
because (1) only legitimate publishers may publish data for
a certain topic, (2) only legitimate subscribers may receive
data from a certain topic, and (3) third parties (incl. DNs,
DBs, and malicious clients) must not modify or spoof topic
data. The actually required security properties for the topic
data transmission may vary depending on the smart grid
applications, and the C-DAX middleware must be capable of
supporting them.
The security architecture of C-DAX provides topic access
control, end-to-end integrity and end-to-end confidentiality of
published data, and authentication of clients and nodes. We
describe those security features in detail below. In contrast to
more innovative solutions for security in information-centric
smart grid middleware presented in [4], the current C-DAX
middleware uses authentication and encryption mechanisms
based on standard cryptographic primitives, i.e., it can be im-
plemented based on established and trusted security libraries.
The C-DAX security architecture does not restrict the type of
cryptographic primitives (i.e. symmetric or asymmetric) used
to secure the communication. Nevertheless, for performance
reasons we rely mainly on symmetric primitives to enforce
the data plane security properties.
We write T for the set of all topics and Kt for a topic key
associated with a topic t ∈ T . Topic keys are generated by
the SecServ, and the SecServ distributes the topic keys to the
respective components as part of the join response message.
B. Security Properties
1) Source Authentication: Source authentication is required
for control plane messages. When processing request mes-
sages, the SecServ needs to verify the identity of the com-
ponent before looking up the permissions of the requesting
party in its access control list (ACL). The same requirement
applies to configuration messages, where DBs need to verify,
that such a messages originates from an authorized node, e.g.,
an RS.
Source authentication is realised using asymmetric cryptog-
raphy., e.g., RSA. Each component is assigned a public/private
key pair (K+,K−). Control plane messages are digitally
signed using the private key K−sender of the respective sender.
The receiver can verify the signatures using K+sender.
As usual, certificates are used to link these keys to iden-
tities. Certificates issued and signed by the SecServ provide
identity information, the associated public key, and additional
attributes. The additional attributes include C-DAX function
information about permission to modify node configurations,
e.g., for the RS function. Certificates can be attached to
the signed messages. Additionally, the SecServ provides a
certificate revocation list (CRL) to allow certificates to be
revoked.
Because of the decoupling of publishers and subscribers,
source authentication for data messages is not available in
most pub/sub systems. Even though source authentication is
not needed for pure topic based communication, there are
smart grid applications (e.g. retail energy transactions) where
messages from a publisher could lead to a binding contract. For
such applications, digital signatures generated with K−sender
can be used to authenticate the sender of a data plane message.
2) Topic Access Control: Topic access control is required
for all topics in order to prevent unauthorized clients from
publishing data. We use a shared symmetric key Kautht to
implement topic access control. This key is used to compute
hash message authentication codes (MACs), and is shared
among authorized publishers and involved forwarding nodes
for topic t. When publishing a data message msg for topic
t, publishers use this key to add MAC(Kautht ,msg) to the
message. The forwarding nodes verify the MACs of incoming
messages, and only forward messages with valid MACs;
messages are discarded otherwise.
3) End-to-End Integrity: End-to-end integrity for all topics
enables subscribers to verify the integrity of received topic data
without having to trust intermediate forwarding nodes. The
topic key Ke2et is introduced to implement end-to-end integrity
in C-DAX, and is used as a shared secret to generate a MAC.
In contrast to Kautht , the SecServ distributes K
e2e
t only to the
publishers and the subscribers of topic t, i.e., the forwarding
nodes do not know Ke2et . Subscribers can verify that an
original message msg was not altered during forwarding when
the received message contains MAC(Ke2et ,msg).
4) End-to-End Confidentiality: Confidentiality means that
only the intended receivers of a message can read the message
content. Because control plane and data plane in C-DAX do
not share the same concept of receivers, we use different
mechanisms to ensure end-to-end confidentiality for control
plane and data plane messages.
a) Control Plane Messages: C-DAX control plane com-
munication consists of point-to-point messages, i.e., only the
single intended receiver of a message should be able to read
the message content. End-to-end confidentiality is especially
important for all control plane messages containing topic keys.
We use asymmetric cryptography to achieve this requirement.
The SecServ uses the public key K+c of a component c to
encrypt the topic key Kt.
b) Data Plane Messages: Data plane communication in
C-DAX is essentially many-to-many communication, i.e., only
the subscribers of topic t should be able to read messages
published to that topic. End-to-end confidentiality is required
for transmission of personal data, e.g., smart metering data for
residential buildings. Asymmetric encryption using individual
public keys of the subscribers is not possible for data plane
messages. As the pub/sub paradigm decouples publishers and
subscribers, the publishers do not know the subscribers and
their respective public keys. Therefore, we use symmetric
ciphers to encrypt the payload of pub/sub data plane messages
using the topic key Ke2et , e.g., AES.
As mentioned above, only publishers and subscribers re-
ceive Ke2et . DNs and DBs cannot decrypt the actual message
content but can detect and discard unauthenticated messages
because they possess Kautht . However, if the forwarding
configuration can be manipulated, publishers are able to de-
crypt messages sent to the same topic by other publishers.
Diversified keys for publishers can be used to prevent this.
Then subscribers are still supplied with Ke2et , which now
acts as a master key, while each publisher receives a unique
identifier x and derived key Ke2ext , derived from the master
key for this value of x using some key derivation function
(KDF): Ke2ext = KDF(K
e2e
t , x). Messages encrypted by a
publisher using Ke2ext now need to include the publisher’s x
in the unencrypted message header. On reception of a message,
subscribers derive the symmetric key for decryption and MAC
verification Ke2ext using the KDF, K
e2e
t , and x. Publishers
cannot derive the keys of other publishers without knowing
the master key Ke2et , so publishers can no longer decrypt any
data plane messages except their own. A similar approach is
proposed in the REMP [8] protocol.
C. Application of the Security Mechanisms
We now show how the security properties are ensured by
applying the security mechanisms described above. We give an
example of how the mechanisms are applied during publication
of confidential topic data, and provide a summary of the keys
and mechanisms used in C-DAX.
Table I provides an overview of the keys used in C-DAX,
the component or topic the key is associated with, and the
components that know the key.
Figure 2 depicts the publication of data over the C-DAX
cloud. The SecServ distributes the topic keys encrypted with
the public keys of the clients and nodes. Publishers and
subscribers receive both Kautht and K
e2e
t (step 1) while the
forwarding nodes only receive Kautht (step 2). The publisher
encrypts the message using Ke2et and generates one MAC
using Kautht and another MAC using K
e2e
t (step 3). The DNs
and DBs forward the message after verifying the MAC using
Kautht (step 4). After receiving the message, the subscriber
TABLE I
OVERVIEW ON KEY TYPES IN C-DAX.
Name Description Associated With Known By
K−c Component private key component c only known by component c
K+c Component public key component c may be known by all components
K+SecServ SecServ public key SecServ must be known by all components
Kautht Topic access control key topic t publishers, DNs, and DBs for topic t
Ke2et End-to-end security key topic t publishers and subscribers for topic t
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Fig. 2. C-DAX security mechanisms applied for publication of topic data.
uses Ke2et to verify the MAC and decrypt the payload (step
5).
TABLE II
C-DAX COMPONENTS AND SUPPORTED OPERATIONS.
Component Mechanisms
SecServ Key generation
ACL lookup
Signing
Signature verification
Asymmetric encryption
Certificate revocation
DB / DN Signing
(forwarding nodes) Signature verification
MAC verification
Asymmetric decryption
Publisher Signing
MAC generation
Symmetric encryption
Asymmetric decryption
Subscriber Signing
Signature verification
MAC verification
Symmetric decryption
Asymmetric decryption
Table II maps the C-DAX components to the mechanisms
they need to support for their operation. While key generation,
authorization, and asymmetric encryption is only performed by
the SecServ, all components have to support signing. The com-
ponents involved in data plane communications (i.e. clients
and forwarding nodes) need to support asymmetric decryption
of topic keys. Additionally, the forwarding nodes need to
verify signatures and MACs. The publishers need to generate
MACs and perform symmetric encryption. Subscribers have to
verify MACs and need to do symmetric decryption. For use
cases like retail energy transactions they also need to verify
publisher signatures.
IV. KEY DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS
We now describe key distribution mechanisms to securely
distribute new topic keys based on the pub/sub mechanisms al-
ready provided by the C-DAX infrastructure. We first describe
the requirements and prerequisites for secure distribution,
propose two key distribution mechanisms, and finally discuss
approaches for scheduling key updates
We use the notation of the symmetric topic key K∗,it , where
K∗t can be one of the keys K
e2e
t or K
auth
t , and i is the index in
a chronological series of K∗t for topic t. When a key update is
performed for a topic t with the current key K∗,it , the updated
key is denoted as K∗,i+1t . Because updated keys need to be
delivered not only to subscribers but also to publishers, we
define a corresponding key-update topic t′ for each regular
topic t. The original subscribers and publishers for topic t are
subscribers of topic t′, and the SecServ is the only publisher
for topic t′.
A. Requirements
To make sure that messages for a topic originate from legiti-
mate publishers and can only be read by legitimate subscribers,
backward secrecy and forward secrecy are required for the
topic keys. We use the definitions from Steiner, Tsudik and
Weidner [9] that have been adopted for the terms forward and
backward secrecy in later literature [10]. Backward secrecy
is defined as the guarantee that “old, previously used group
keys must not be discovered by new group members”. Forward
secrecy is defined as the guarantee that “new keys must remain
out of reach of former group members”.
In the case of Ke2et , full forward and backward secrecy
is required to prevent subscribers from decrypting messages
that were not published during their subscription period. That
means, the topic encryption key needs to be changed each time
a subscriber joins or leaves the topic. For Kautht only forward
secrecy is required because MACs generated with previous
keys cannot be used for publishing data. Therefore, Kautht
only needs to be changed when a publisher leaves the topic t.
To maintain forward secrecy, the new topic key K∗,i+1t
cannot be transmitted encrypted using the old topic key
Ke2e,it . Therefore, we must rely on asymmetric encryption to
distribute the new keys and individually encrypt K∗,i+1t using
K+c1 ...K
+
cn , with Ct = {c1, ..., cn} being the set of publishers
and subscribers for topic t.
B. Distribution of Asymmetric Keys
As a prerequisite for secure key distribution in C-DAX,
the component’s asymmetric key pair (K+c ,K
−
c ) and the
public key K+SecServ of the SecServ are pre-installed on
each component c. Those key pairs are intended to be long-
term keys, i.e., they are only changed if the original key is
considered compromised or otherwise insecure. As there is
no secure way to remotely install a new key on a device
whose keys can no longer be trusted, manual intervention
is required anyway. Therefore, we do not define automated
update mechanisms for this.
C. Topic Key Update: a Push Approach
As a naı¨ve solution, the SecServ can distribute updated keys
by publishing them to t′. The distribution of the updated keys
could be done in individual messages or concatenated to one
large message.
This approach has two major scalability drawbacks. The
first and more obvious problem is that the SecServ needs
to transmit n encrypted keys through all DBs and DNs. The
clients would receive multiple keys but can only decrypt one
of them. To reduce this overhead at the receiver side, filters
can be deployed at the DNs to reduce the number of keys
delivered to the individual clients at the cost of increasing the
complexity of DNs. As an alternative, separate topics could
be created per client at the cost of increasing the complexity
of DBs and topic management.
The second problem is that the SecServ is required to
know the current subscription state of each topic to select the
required set of public keys for encryption of the topic keys.
Keeping the subscription state can be avoided by using the
ACL as source for the set Ct. On the other hand, this could lead
to unnecessary key transmissions and would prevent wildcards
from being used in the ACLs.
D. Topic Key Update: a Pull Approach
Alternatively, a pull mechanism can be used for key update
notification which does not suffer from the drawbacks of the
push mechanism. For this we use the topic-based pub/sub
communication only to advertise the key update event, but not
to publish the actual keys. The SecServ publishes a simple
unencrypted notification message to topic t′, and the clients
are responsible for requesting a new key upon reception of the
key update notification message.
The procedure of notification and subsequent key retrieval
request is shown in Figure 3. The update notification is
published by the SecServ to the DB and forwarded via DNs to
the clients (step 1). The clients then send a signed message to
the SecServ via their DN to request the new topic keys (step
2). The SecServ sends the new topic keys encrypted with the
respective public key to the clients (step 3). For the sake of
readability, requests of DBs and DNs to retrieve Kautht are
omitted in the figure.
The key retrieval process is similar to the topic join process
described in Section II.
Compared to the push approach, the pull method needs
additional messages (notification and retrieval request). On the
other hand, the pull method helps to avoid unnecessary key
transmissions, and the SecServ does not need to keep track
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of the current subscription state. However, this optimization
of the SecServ comes with an increased risk of denial of
service (DoS) attacks because by providing a mechanism to
actively retrieve topic keys from the SecServ, clients have
the opportunity to trigger expensive asymmetric encryption
operations at the SecServ by sending multiple key retrieval
requests. To prevent clients from overloading the SecServ
with unnecessary key retrieval requests, DNs may cache the
encrypted topic keys for the clients they are serving. Any
subsequent key retrieval requests for the same client and topic
can be handled by the DN without involving the SecServ while
the key is valid. DNs can remove the old cached key should
they receive an unencrypted key update notification from the
SecServ, and cache the new key during the topic key retrieval
process of a client.
E. Key Update Triggers
Key updates can be scheduled periodically by configuring a
key lifetime and replacing it after expiration. Key updates can
also be triggered by join or leave events and ACL changes.
The advantage of periodical key updates is that there is no
means to attack the SecServ by intentionally causing key
updates. However, topics with low fluctuation in the set of
publishers and subscribers benefit from event-triggered key
updates because unnecessary key updates can be avoided.
F. Key Transitions
We need a mechanism for a seamless transition because the
simultaneous replacement of K∗,it by K
∗,i+1
t at all involved
parties is impossible. Therefore, subscribers need to preserve
the outdated key K∗,it for a short time after the key update.
If publishers switch to the new keys with a small additional
delay and include an identification number like the index i of
the key used into the message, the transition K∗,it → K∗,i+1t
can be performed without the risk of delivering messages to
subscribers that are not yet or no longer in possession of the
required key.
V. RELATED WORK
The SeDAX [11] architecture uses geographical routing
on a Delaunay-triangulated (DT) overlay network to forward
messages to the responsible broker. The resilient end-to-end
message protection framework (REMP) [8] of SeDAX uses
long-term keys for each participating overlay node which are
assigned during node authentication. The actual end-to-end
communication between publishers and subscribers in SeDAX
is protected using symmetric encryption with diversified keys
based on the long-term node keys.
Nabeel et al. [12] propose a privacy-preserving context-
based pub/sub system based on a modified Paillier cryptosys-
tem and a group key management scheme. Subscriptions and
content notifications are blinded in the system so that only
legitimate brokers are able to match publishers to subscribers.
The authors implemented their approach on the ActiveMQ
pub/sub system and provide practical results showing the
efficiency of their approach for a simple test setup. However,
the approach may not be suitable for large data volumes and
large number of publishers and subscribers because of the
limited message routing efficiency as stated by the authors.
Barenghi and Pelosi [13] discuss general security and
privacy challenges in smart grid infrastructures. They first
analyze potential interactions of smart grid actors in the future
smart grid and then address the identified challenges by giving
recommendations to existing solutions. Their general recom-
mendation is to use symmetric and asymmetric encryption,
and secure hashing to protect information flows in the smart
grid.
Wu and Zhou [14] propose a fault-tolerant and scalable
key management system for smart grid communication based
on a public key infrastructure and the Needham-Schroeder
authentication protocol. Symmetric encryption is used for data
communication while asymmetric encryption is used for key
distribution. In contrast to our approach, this scheme generates
a new session key for any single triggered message flow event,
e.g., a data refresh timeout.
Long, Tipper, and Qian [15] propose a key management
scheme for smart grid communications based on Iolus [16]. It
is an hierarchical approach aimed at reducing the impact of
triggered key updates by limiting them to the subtree where
the group change has occurred.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a security architecture for the C-
DAX middleware.. We defined the security properties source
authentication, topic access control, end-to-end integrity, and
end-to-end confidentiality for C-DAX and presented the mech-
anisms used to enforce them. We described how keys are
initially distributed and how they are updated either in regular
intervals or as a response to topic joins and leaves. A subset
of this architecture is already implemented in the C-DAX
prototype and is used in a field trial to securely exchange
phasor measurement data in the Alliander LiveLab [17] smart
grid test site.
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